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This study explores the role of incentives—monetary or non-monetary 
compensation offered to children so that an educational need is fulfilled or 
perceived cost is brought down—in attaining certain expected educational 
enrolment and retention outcomes. It draws on a survey conducted in six villages 
in Gujarat. Incentives themselves may not be that critical in improving access and 
retention performance; other socio-economic and school-related factors may be 
more significant in ensuring access and retention. However, incentives may have 
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Achieving the goals of “education for all” calls for attention to both educational provision 
and increasing the demand from the users or beneficiaries of education—families and 
communities. The traditional approach to educational planning, until recent times when a 
mission-oriented approach to elementary education was introduced, has focused on the 
former—providing school infrastructure and teachers, expanding opportunities for 
targeted groups like girls and children belonging to deprived groups, and reforming 
curriculum. However, what may affect demand for education among certain 
economically-deprived communities are the high perceived direct and indirect costs 
associated with schooling and certain social barriers that work against gender and social 
equality in educational access ([1]). “Incentives” constitute one route to reducing the 
perceived costs of schooling from the perspective of communities that are socially and 
economically deprived. They are expected to attract hitherto deprived child segments to 
school (resulting in higher enrolment rates) and to keep them there (as evidenced by 
higher attendance rates, lower dropout and repetition rates) so that the children receive at 
least elementary education. Incentives thus have a dual role: attracting children to 
school—that is, by overcoming any social and economic barriers to enrolment; and 
overcoming those factors that may contribute to lower attendance and dropping out. The 
latter may include both supply-side factors, like poor quality education, and high 
opportunity and indirect costs of schooling, in the case of girls and certain social groups.   
 
Educational “incentives” are monetary or non-monetary compensation offered to children 
and their families so that an educational need is fulfilled or perceived cost is brought 
down, in order to enable achievement of a desired educational goal. Examples of 
incentives include scholarships to children of certain sections of society, free books and 
uniforms, bicycles to girls who reach upper primary school, and monetary instruments 
like the ‘Vidyalakshmi’ bonds (Gujarat) and Kanya Vidya Dhan Yojana (Uttar Pradesh) 
for girls. In other countries, educational vouchers, cash transfers to parents and 
enrolment-based school funding constitute aspects of incentive provision ([2]). The 
National Child Labour Programme (NCLP) in India is an example of a conditional cash 
transfer program designed to ensure attendance of rehabilitated child laborers in bridge 
courses.  The mid-day meal scheme now has expanded significantly and has taken on the 
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character of a universal incentive rather than a targeted incentive, unlike the case of 
scholarships and free textbooks. 
 
This study seeks to explore the role of targeted incentives in attaining certain expected 
educational enrolment and retention outcomes among socially deprived children and their 
communities. That is, the relationship between educational performance and incentives 
would indicate the impact of targeted educational provision on decision-making at the 
household level (see [3] for a summary status of social disparities and out-of-school 
status). The study does not attempt to link incentives with achievement levels of children, 
and limits itself to the stated aims of incentives, namely improving access and retention. 
The broader implications of any incentive scheme is the linkages it has with other levels 
of education (for instance, secondary and higher education), and the horizontal linkages 
with other social safety nets (for instance, scholarships that may result in a stronger 
income effect rather than a price effect, linkages with anti-poverty measures, and linkages 
with implementation systems of the state).   
 
In other words, the policy implications of assessing the role of educational incentives 
would deal with the following dimensions: (a) distribution of incentives across different 
groups in society, (b) inclusion and exclusion errors associated with targeting incentives, 
(c) implementation of an incentive scheme so that a price effect is ensured, (d) impact on 
social and gender equity, and educational performance, (e) differential targeting and 
ensuring match between need and provision, and (f) impact at the family and community 
level educational decision making. 
  
The present study is designed as an exploratory exercise. The role and impact of 
educational incentives on access and retention is a relatively under-studied area.  A study 
commissioned by the World Bank (see [4] pp.264-266) to overcome the gap in the 
incentive literature noted that apart from problems in the delivery of incentive schemes, 
the schemes themselves did not seem to be effective in increasing enrolment and 
attendance, and in reducing drop out. The teachers ranked textbooks, uniforms, stationery 
and allowances, in that order, as important incentives. It was not clear to what extent the 
current schemes had contributed to increasing enrolment or reducing drop out, and what 
level of incentives would be needed to bring out-of-school children back to school. In any 
case, the level of scholarship provided was way below the earnings of working children 
who did not attend school. In an exchange of experiences among development 
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practitioners, incentives were, however, felt to have had a positive impact in terms of 
their role in meeting the costs of education. Other points noted were the often inadequate 
quantum of incentives, poor implementation of the schemes, and the lack of information 
about incentives among parents (http://www.solutionexchange-un.net.in/en/Download-
document/49-Adequacy-and-Coverage-of-Incentives-to-Achieve-UEE.html, retrieved on 
July 31, 2008). The practitioners also note that incentives may work better in a functional 
school system, and that any system of incentives has to show flexibility in its approach 
and be implemented well. 
 
The specific questions this paper addresses are: Do those receiving incentives show 
significantly higher levels of schooling completion and in-school status than those who do 
not? Do those receiving incentives show significantly lower levels of drop out and never-
enrolled status than those who do not? 
 
2.  Methodology and data collection 
 
Given the exploratory nature of the study, it was decided to sample three villages in each 
of two districts of Gujarat. Surendranagar, which has a large Other Backward Classes 
(OBC) and Scheduled Caste (SC) population, and Sabarkantha, which has a large 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) population, were selected as the study districts. The villages were 
selected at random, ensuring that the selected villages had all the socio-economic 
categories. A survey of all the households (nuclear family unit) in each village was 
conducted. To coordinate the survey data collection exercise, two retired primary school 
teachers from the districts were appointed as team leaders. They have been involved in a 
variety of administrative responsibilities and are aware of the intricacies of eligibilities for 
and disbursement of incentives. They are also aware of the caste composition of the 
villages in the two districts. They hired five young teachers for data collection. The team 
was trained in data collection through a one-day workshop. 
 
Three villages were selected from Sabarkantha. These were Padar (which included two 
more associated villages/habitat Mahudi and Shantipura), Shangal (one and two) and 
Kolundra (which included Jalaram village and factory compound habitat). All the 
households (476) of these three villages were covered, village-wise numbers being: 
Padar: 188, Shangal: 140, Kolundra: 148. In Surendranagar district, Chikasar, Alampura 
and Ambada villages were selected. Since the villages in Surendranagar are large, 953 
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households were covered in the survey, village-wise numbers being: Chikasar: 404, 
Alampura: 309, Ambala: 240. 
 
Data was collected at the family level and then at the child level if the child is in the age 
group 6-14 years. A family is defined as a group comprising the children and their 
parents. At the family level the data collected included father’s education, occupation, 
religion, caste, income (estimated from agricultural, labour and other revenues, family 
expenditure (monthly), mother’s education, family composition by age and sex and 
number of literate and illiterate family members above 14 years of age classified by sex. 
At the child level data on child’s age, sex, educational status during 1999-2006 
(whichever years are applicable), current schooling status and types of incentives received 
during 1999-2006 (with cross-checking through the school), attendance records (from the 
schools) and home study patterns. In addition, interviews with teachers and selected 
parents were conducted. 
 
3.  Summarization of data 
 
One of the major supply side interventions is the building of primary schools in almost 
every village and providing the necessary infrastructure (see [5]). In Gujarat there is a 
primary school within a radius of 1 km from every village. Also, in all the sampled 
schools the student-teacher ratios are significantly less than the national ratio 40:1. For 
Alampura it is 25.4:1, for Ambada 34.12:1, for Chikasar 37.57:1 for Shangal 25.1:1 and 
31:1, each for Kolundra and Padar Mahudi (ssamgujarat.org/annual_report2005/ 
Chapter_01.html).  
 
In the sampled villages, the percentages of dropped-out and never-enrolled students are 
quite low; only 2.57% of a total of 1208 children are never enrolled and 0.9% dropped 
out, i.e. the in-school status accounts for nearly 96.5%. This at first glance may appear 
surprising, but is in conformance with the International Educational Statistics report that 
the average primary school net attendance rate in Gujarat is more than 90% 
(huebler.blogspot.com/2007/12/ primary-school-attendance-by-state-in.html).Table1 
shows the number of never-enrolled and dropped-out children classified according to sex 
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Table 1: Number of never enrolled and drop-out children classified according to the 
caste, religion and sex.  
 
 
Caste         Never enrolled 
 
Male    Female      Total 
              Drop out 
 
Male      Female     Total 
SC      1           3              4    3              6              9 
ST    10         11             21    1              1              2  
OBC      3           3               6    4              7             11 
Total     14         17            31    8             14            22 
 
 
Though the numbers of dropped-out and never-enrolled are larger among females, they 
are not significantly higher.  However, among children belonging to ST, the number of 
never-enrolled is found to be significantly higher than the other castes. Table 2 
summarizes the background economic conditions of the sampled children’s family 
classified by caste. 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of children classified by monthly expenditure and caste 
 
Monthly Expenditure  SC  ST  OBC  General 
Percentage 
of children 
<1000  65  57  66  20  62 
1001-1500   5  16  23  49  20 
1501-2000  13  19  8  21  12 
2001-3000  10   2  2  10   3 
>=3000   7  6  1  0   3 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Most of the children are from weak economic backgrounds though the general category 
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Table 3: Percentage of children from different castes, by educational background of 
parents 
 






















Father 74  7  1 18  100   
SC(Hindu)  Mother 35  3  7  55 100 
Father 70  1  5 24  100   
ST(Hindu)  Mother 23  3  4  70 100 
Father 55  7  14  24  100   
OBC(Hindu)  Mother           24  2  19  55  100 
Father 82  9  0 9  100   
OBC(Muslim)  Mother 43  9  0  48 100 
Father 100  0  0  0 100   
General(Hindu)  Mother    89  6  5  0  100 
 
Clearly General (Hindu) parents, especially the mothers, are better educated.  
 
4.  Incentives: A broad picture 
 
Given the focus of this study, this section provides a broad picture of some of the 
dimensions of the incentives that children have received. (See Annexure 1 for a list of the 
incentives.) One significant feature of the distribution of incentives is that 91.8% of the 
children (92.4% of the boys and 90.2% of the girls) received at least one incentive during 
their stay in school. This distribution appears to be irrespective of the caste status of the 
children. 
 




 Boys  Girls 
SC 86.08% 84.72% 
ST 88.79% 89.08% 
OBC 94.96% 92.00% 
General 87.10% 85.00% 
 92.38% 90.20% 
Note: 101 out of the 104 Muslim children in the sample are covered under OBC; 94.4% 
of the 54 boys and 98% of the 50 girls have received incentives. 
 
In terms of the number of incentives received per year of stay in school, more than half 
have received above two to three.  
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Table 5: Percentage receiving incentives, by number of incentives 
 
 Number   
No incentives  69  5.90%
Two or less  212  18.14%
Above two to three   662  56.63%
Four or more  226  19.33%
   1169   
 
Examining the relative importance of the various incentives, not surprisingly, uniforms 
and scholarships (each accounting for about a third of the total number of incentives 
received by the children over the period for which records were studied), and textbooks 
(about 28 percent), are the three most important; all the others accounting for less than 
four percent.  
 
Table 6: Relative importance of incentives 
 
Type of incentive 
Total number for all 
children, all years 
Uniforms 4023  33.9%
OBC scholarships  2758  23.2%
SC/ST scholarships  1209  10.2%
Economically backward scholarships  106  0.9%
Education kits of NPEGEL  267  2.2%
Textbooks 3371  28.4%
Schoolbags 140  1.2%
Others 5  0.0%
 11879  100.0%
 
Note:  
1.  ‘Others’ include educational material support, workbooks and other minor 
support. 
2.  Most of the ‘Education kits of NPEGEL’ is accounted for by one year when such 
kits were distributed. 
 
5.  Data analysis and findings 
 
We have already noted (cf. Table 1) that in the sampled villages the percentage of never-
enrolled and dropped-out students is extremely low, and so will not be addressing this 
issue here. Whether this picture extends to major areas of the state, or whether there are 
other factors peculiar to this sample (like the impact of the mid-day meal scheme which 
observations indicate is being implemented well) needs further examination. 
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Regarding attendance, we probe further to see whether economic and educational 
backgrounds of the parents, castes, religions and gender have an effect on the average 
attendance (proportion of days a student attended the school out of 225 working days). 
We have calculated the average attendance for children belonging to each of the above 
categories. None of the differences in average attendance between a pair of castes, 
parents’ educational backgrounds, religions, genders are found to be significant at 5% 
level of significance.  
 
Many incentives are provided to a student based on his/her performance in the previous 
class, his/her attendance rate (numbers of working days are all equal to 225 in the 
sampled primary schools) and his/her socio-economic background, so as to encourage 
him/her to attend the school regularly. In other words, two students performing equally 
well but having different socio-economic backgrounds are entitled to different number of 
incentives.  To study the impact of incentives on attendance rate, we consider the average 
number of incentives received by a student per year as a measure. It should be noted that 
we have ignored the relative importance of different incentives for simplicity. We find 
that the correlation coefficient between this measure of incentive and average attendance 
is 0.02 which is highly insignificant. Thus incentives do not seem to have any effect on 
attendance. 
 
Next, we investigate whether the performance of a child is affected by the incentives 
controlling for other factors viz., his or her sex, caste, religion, parents’ educational 
background, monthly family expenditure, father’s occupation, attendance rate and the 
nature of support he or she receives for study at home. As a measure of performance of a 
student we have taken the average number of grades passed per year of his or her 
schooling. Thus the measure lies between 0 and 1, 1 being the case when a student passes 
without repeating a class. The performance measures for the never-enrolled and dropped-
out students are taken as zero. The number of children who migrated in the sampled 
villages from other parts is very small. For our analysis we have taken them as non-
repeaters.  
 
Next, we ran a regression of performance measure on average number of incentives 
received per year controlling for the other potential influencing variables mentioned 
above viz., attendance rate (proportion of days attended school out of 225 working days), 
monthly expenditure (1 if <1000, 2 if between 1000 and 1500, etc.), mother’s education 
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(=1, if completed elementary education or neo literate, 0, otherwise), father’s education 
(same as mother), home study (0 for no study, 1 for irregular study, 2 for with the help of 
family members, 3 for self-study), father’s occupation (1-3, corresponding to three 
categories), sex (male =1, female =0), religion (Muslim =1, Hindu =0,) and a dummy for 
each of the castes SC, ST and OBC. The regression coefficient of average number of 
incentives has come out to be insignificant. On further investigation it was found that 
87% of the observations have performance measure values equal to 1 which possibly add 
to the error part substantially and thus making it insignificant.  
 
Next, we ran a regression for the group of students (comprising 111 students) whose 
performance measures are less than 1 and greater than 0. These are the students who have 
repeated at least one year. Instead of taking performance measure as the dependent 
variable, we take a logit transformation of the performance measure (which resulted in the 
enhancement of R
2 to 0.425) and ran a regression on the average number of incentives 
controlling for the same factors as above. The results are exhibited in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Performance of repeaters 





  Model  B 
Std. 
Error  Beta          t    p-value 
(Constant)  1.627  .422    3.859  .000 
Average Number of 
Incentives  .495  .082  .477  6.066  .000 
Average Attendance  -1.256  .300  -.338  -4.185  .000 
Mothers’ Education  .015  .023  .058  .662  .510 
Fathers’ Education  .003  .014  .019  .183  .856 
Monthly Expenditure  -.424  .299  -.127  -1.416  .160 
Study at Home  -.186  .141  -.102  -1.322  .189 
Fathers’ Occupation  .033  .133  .020  .251  .802 
Sex  -.148  .082  -.132  -1.801  .075 
Religion  -.295  .110  -.216  -2.689  .008 
SC  -.413  .367  -.190  -1.125  .263 
ST  -.401  .433  -.095  -.927  .356 
OBC  -.539  .326  -.298  -1.652  .102 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: ln ((performance measure)/(1-(performance measure)))   
 
   
 
The results show that for this group of students, average number of incentives, average 
attendance and religion are statistically significant at 5% level and sex is significant at 
7.5% level. Notice that the results indicate that an increase in average number of 
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incentives would tend to enhance the performance but contrary to intuition attendance has 
a negative effect on the performance. One explanation of such an anomalous result could 
be that in this group there are students who attend school regularly for having mid-day 
meal, but are not so serious about learning. Also it is a bit surprising to find that monthly 
expenditure does not have a significant effect on performance. 
 
6. Concluding  discussion 
 
This study has brought out some interesting results which are worth studying further. 
First, if the data is a reflection of ground reality prevailing in rural Gujarat then the state 
may have attained a very high enrollment level and has been able to reduce the drop-outs 
among children to low levels. So improving enrollment and reducing drop-out may no 
longer be top priorities, thus allowing more attention to quality of education. Further 
research is needed to understand this phenomenon. It is also interesting to note that levels 
of enrollment and drop-out are not dependent on incentives, gender, caste, religion, 
income and educational background of the parents. Also, it has been observed that 
attendance rate does not depend on any of the factors mentioned above. One hunch which 
needs to be explored is the role of the mid-day meal scheme in improving attendance 
rates.  
 
The regression analysis based on the full data set clearly showed that the access and 
retention performance is not affected by the average number of incentives after 
controlling for the other factors mentioned above. In addition, these factors also do not 
have a significant influence on the performance. Looking at the data more carefully we 
find that around 86% of the children’s performance measure are equal to 1, the highest 
value, irrespective of the values taken by the other factors mentioned above. Thus the 
performance measure we use is not sensitive enough to capture the performance 
differences. This is because unless a child is found to be seriously lacking in progress, he 
or she may not have to repeat the same grade. Also before Class 3, children are not tested 
by an examination. Thus, performance measure of a child equal to 1 may not reflect the 
true measure of his or her educational performance. Performance measure equal to 1 most 
possibly does not mean that the child has acquired the basic skills of reading and writing 
which he or she is supposed to acquire even after completing the elementary education.  
So the question is what are the factors—community and family—that motivate them to 
continue.       
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However, the effect of incentives, attendance and religion came out significant with 
respect to the performances of the children if we consider only the poor performers 
(whose performance measure less than unity). However, there is a problem of 
endogeneity as one of the criteria for promotion to the next grade is rate of attendance 
itself. We also ran regression of logit performance on others excluding average 
attendance; the religion came out as insignificant but average number of incentives 
received is still found significant. So it may be interesting to investigate further whether 
incentives, as indicated here, truly encourage the poorer performers to remain in school.   
 
It is not clear whether incentives alone, at the current levels, can bring into school the 
small numbers who are not enrolled or have dropped out. While on paper the list of 
incentives is long, the most important incentives are only three: scholarships, uniforms 
and textbooks.  Interviews indicate that the scholarship incentive is taken very seriously 
by both teachers and parents. The head teachers prepare proposals for scholarships and 
supply of uniforms in July; these include the family income of the students and their 
marks—grades were introduced in the year preceding this study—in the last final 
examination. The proposals are consolidated grade-wise and according to sex. The head 
teachers then attend a camp organized by the Social Welfare Office in August for 
sanctioning incentives to eligible students. The scholarships are usually disbursed by end 
September or early October. The same is the case with respect to the other incentives. 
That is, there are no serious implementation issues in the sampled villages. The relative 
economic homogeneity, and parental awareness of the main incentives available, makes it 
easier for the teachers to handle differential targeting of incentives and to avoid inclusion 
and exclusion errors.  
 
In brief, this exploratory study indicates that incentives in general may not be that critical 
in improving access and retention performance; the complex influence of other socio-
economic and school-related factors may have a more significant role to play in ensuring 
access and retention. However, incentives may have a positive effect in keeping the 
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 Scheme  Conditions  Remarks 
1. Scholarship to pre-S.S.C. 
students 
Income limit  










2.  Scholarship to SEBC students 












3.  Two pairs of uniform to be 
provided free of cost 
Income limit  Rs.15000  EBC, Minority, 
11000, 
Nomadic,15000 
4.  Scholarship to extremely 
backward class and most 




Std. 1 to 5 







 Scheme  Details  Remarks 
1. Scholarship  to 
students of Std. 1 
to 4 
No income limit 




Attendance: At least 70% and 
pass. 
 
2.  Scholarship to SC 
Students in Std. 5 
to 7 
No income limit 




For private schools marks % 




student from Std. 
1-7 
No Income limit 




% attendance last year: 70 
Available for two children. 
Two more ‘girl children’ are 
eligible.  
 






No income limit 
% marks: 38 
Scholarship 
Std. 1 to 5: Rs.400 
Std. 6 & 7: Rs.600 
Plus ad hoc Rs.550 
Not eligible for any other 
benefit in any other scheme. 
5.  Free books and 
uniform (two 
pairs) (Std. 1-7), 
landless 
labourers. 
Income Limit: rural Rs.15976;  urban 
Rs.21206 
Scholarship: Rs.150  
(Assistance for two pairs of uniforms) 
% marks: 38 
Should belong to BPL family; 
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